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Abstract
Colombia’s Internet connectivity has increased immensely. Colombia has also ‘opened 
for business’, leading to an influx of extractive projects to which social movements 
object heavily. Studies on the role of digital media in political mobilisation in 
developing countries are still scarce. Using surveys, interviews, and reviews of 
literature, policy papers, website and social media content, this study examines the role 
of digital and social media in social movement organisations and asks how increased 
digital connectivity can help spread knowledge and mobilise mining protests. Results 
show that the use of new media in Colombia is hindered by socioeconomic constraints, 
fear of oppression, the constraints of keyboard activism and strong hierarchical power 
structures within social movements. Hence, effects on political mobilisation are still 
limited. Social media do not spontaneously produce non-hierarchical knowledge 
structures. Attention to both internal and external knowledge sharing is therefore 
conditional to optimising digital and social media use.
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Introduction
Digital media use developed significantly the past decade, providing mobilising and 
opportunity structures that allow social movement organisations (SMOs) to emerge or 
renovate and spread their narratives through social media (Juris, 2005; McAdam et al., 
1996 cited in Garrett, 2006). Colombia is one of those countries where Internet and 
mobile technologies expanded tremendously (Ministerio de Tecnologías de la 
Información y las Comunicaciones [MinTIC], 2014). The question of how digital and 
social media affect activism and SMOs in Colombia is therefore opportune. This study 
assesses this impact on SMOs engaging in mining protests. Digital and social media1 
transform political activism and SMOs notably in terms of action repertoire, spatial 
scope of action, international exposure and potential social influence (Anduiza et al., 
2012; Gil de Zúñiga, 2009; Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010). However, most literature 
on SMOs and digital media tends to focus on developed countries (e.g. Bennett et al., 
2008; Garrett, 2006) and the Islamic world (e.g. Juris, 2005; Robertson, 2015). Studies 
on how digital media affect political mobilisation in developing countries are still 
scarce (e.g. Ali, 2011; Harlow, 2012; Rojas and Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Valenzuela, 2013).
Focusing on protests against the gold mining company La Colosa in Tolima 
Department, this article aims to contribute to this field by addressing the questions of 
(1) whether and how Colombian SMOs use digital media in protesting against adverse 
effects of the mining industry in Colombia, (2) whether these technologies create the 
critical mass to fight the mining company and (3) whether they enhance horizontal 
leadership and knowledge structures. After presenting the contextual background and 
methodology employed, we address these questions in the ‘Results’ section. We then 
discuss the potential of digital and social media in mining protests. The conclusion 
answers the research questions and discusses the implications.
Background
Growing resistance against the mining industry
Colombia is home to 12 of the world’s largest gold deposits (those over 1 million oz). 
In the past decade, high demand and prices, improved security and public policies gave 
a boost to the industry, with the departments of Antioquia and Chocó being the lead 
producers (Sarmiento et al., 2013). The Santos government’s policy of opening doors 
to foreign mining companies has paved the way for foreign exploitation. Despite a 
mere 2% contribution to Colombia’s gross domestic product (GDP), mining helped to 
stimulate an average 4.8% GDP growth rate between 2010 and 2013, making Colombia 
the fifth largest economy in Latin America (World Bank, 2015). Through a business-
friendly and security-oriented policy, the government hopes to attract foreign 
investment, stimulate export and the inflow of foreign exchange and stabilise the 
national economy (Aguilera, 2012; Vélez-Torres, 2014). Conversely, expanding gold 
mining brings competing land and water claims, pollution with cyanide and heavy 
metals, environmental degradation, displacement of communities, increasing 
militarisation and policing, violations of indigenous and human rights, and loss of 
livelihood opportunities for farmers, small-scale miners and workers in the tourism 
industry.2 Mining expansion since the mid-2000s has therefore led to increased protests 
and the rise of environmental SMOs across the country. Of the 99 environmental 
conflicts in Colombia registered in the Environmental Justice Atlas (ejatlas.org), 36 
revolve around gold with varying intensity levels (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Gold mining-related conflicts reported by Ejolt Atlas 2012–2015, Conflict Data, June 
2015 (http://ejatlas.org/, accessed June 2015).
Among the high-level conflicts is the Angostura mining project in the Páramo de 
Santurbán in eastern Colombia, involving more than 40 SMOs (Özkaynak and 
Rodríguez-Labajos, 2012). AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), the company involved in the 
conflict addressed in this article, is also involved in several other mining conflicts 
classed as medium-to-high level, for example, those associated with the Gramalote 
mining project and mining in the municipality of Jericó (Antioquia) and the Serranía de 
San Lucas conflict (southern Bolivar).
These protests occur against a background of violent conflict due to guerrilla war 
and drug trafficking, brutal oppression, structural poverty, natural resource conflicts 
and almost constant US military interventions (Sarmiento et al., 2013). Demonstrating 
a statistically significant increase in homicides and massacres in municipalities with 
gold production, Idrobo et al. (2014) believe that gold is ‘the new engine in the 
Colombian conflict’ (p. 4).
Protests achieved minor successes, such as the suspension of policies that promote 
large-scale mining in the Quindío Department, re-assessment of World Bank funding 
for the Angostura mining project in the Páramo of Santurbán and delays of explorations 
due to successful court cases or disputed Environmental Impact Assessments 
(ejatlas.org; Özkaynak and Rodríguez-Labajos, 2012).
Uptake of mobile and digital technologies and social media use in 
Colombia
Colombia has 25 million Internet users (52% of the population), 63.8% of whom 
accessed Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and other social networking sites in 2014 
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística [DANE], 2015; International 
Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2014a, 2014b; MinTIC, 2014). The proportion of 
individuals using the Internet in Colombia is higher than neighbouring Andean 
countries, and in terms of Internet connectivity, Colombia occupies a middle position 
between developed and developing countries (Table 1).
Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants increased from 97.7 in 2010 to 
108.3 in 2013 (MinTIC, 2014), and mobile Internet subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in 
2014 (42.2%) had grown 16% compared to 2010 (MinTIC, 2014). Hence, there is 
sufficient infrastructure in Colombia for digital media to play a role in SMO protests. 
The introduction of Facebook’s ‘internet.org’ project in Colombia in January 2015 is 
likely to see this usage increase dramatically (MinTIC, 2015).
Case study area: Cajamarca region, Tolima Department
Cajamarca (18,000 inhabitants) is situated in the Tolima Department along the highway 
from Bogotá to the rest of western Colombia. The town caters to this passing trade, but 
most inhabitants are employed in farming. Unemployment runs at 12.4% with many 
people living subsistence lifestyles on small land plots (DANE, 2014). Wired Internet 
and telephone access is limited and physical connections do not reach many of the 
outlying parts of the town. Ibagué (650,000 inhabitants), the department capital, 
conversely has accessible Internet connections to most homes.
Tolima sits upon a large gold deposit. With estimated resources of 26.9 Moz 
(million ounces) and an average head grade (metal content of ore) of 0.81 g/t, annual 
production of 70 tonnes over 25 years is anticipated (AGA, 2012). In 2003, this deposit 
was sold as the Colosa mining concession to the South African AGA company – the 
world’s third largest gold producer, active in Colombia since 2000 (AGA, 2012). The 
600-km2 concession lies 14 km from Cajamarca and 6 km from the main highway in 
the Coello basin (AGA, 2011). When operational, La Colosa will add significantly to 
AGA’s portfolio within Colombia (AGA, 2011).
Despite AGA’s ‘commitment to environmental stewardship’ (AGA, 2008), concerns 
about adverse impacts of La Colosa revolve around the potential destruction of the 
Table 1. Internet and mobile phone use in Colombia in comparative perspective (2013).























Bolivia 97.7 39.5b 14 3.78 25 107
Colombia 104.1 51.7b 25 4.95 14 77
Ecuador 111.5 40.4b 27 5.46 19 55
Peru 98.1 39.2b 3 4.00 24 105
Venezuela 101.6 54.9b 4 4.81 16 80
Sources: aWorld Bank (2015), bITU (2014a) and cITU (2014b).
ITU: International Telecommunication Union; ICT: information and communications technology; IDI: ICT 
development index.
páramo, a rare tropical mountain habitat,3 and the consequences for drinking water 
provision in Cajamarca and rice production downstream4 due to the huge quantities of 
water needed for the mining activities and water pollution due to waste and waste rock 
disposal containing heavy metals and poisons such as arsenic and mercury (Özkaynak 
and Rodríguez-Labajos, 2012). Several interviewees (see section ‘Methodology’) also 
expressed fears that Cajamarca will be ‘consumed’ by the mining complex and that the 
social fabric would be negatively affected by diverging opinions on the mine among 
family and friends. Several SMOs within and outside the region protest the extractive 
industry (Table 2).
Hypotheses
Reducing communication costs, facilitating communication between geographically 
dispersed persons and aiding the formation of collective identities, Internet and digital 
media allow a space for voice and political mobilisation (Bennett, 2003: 143). This 
article discusses four factors that determine the political effectiveness of digital and 
social media use by SMOs: socioeconomic constraints, fear of oppression, the risks of 
keyboard activism and ‘clicktivism’, and the internal politics of knowledge.
Socioeconomic constraints
The persisting digital divide (Harlow, 2012; Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010) and 
different cultural contexts (Harlow and Harp, 2012; Valenzuela, 2013) may affect 
digital and social media use and effectiveness among SMOs in developing countries 
differently. Despite increased connectivity, Colombia still suffers from a digital divide. 
Mobile Internet use is not affordable for all: the cost of handset-based mobile-
broadband services is 1% of disposable income for the richest 20% and more than 20% 
of disposable income for the poorest 20% of the population (ITU, 2014a: 147–148). 
While all regions have network coverage, at least in department capitals (MinTIC, 
2014), there is still a significant urban-rural divide (ITU, 2014a). Literacy, language 
barriers and cultural relevance have also been mentioned as constraints to the use of 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) in developing countries (Ali, 
2011). Hence, our first hypothesis:
Table 2. Overview of SMOs protesting La Colosa.
SMO Location Scope and characteristics
1. Semillas de Agua Bogotá/Ibagué Established in 1992 to protect 
water. Strong international 
network. Leading pioneer in 
resisting La Colosa
2. WWF Colombia Cali Broad scope of actions related to 
freshwater, forests, climate 
change, oceans. Provides advice 
and training to SMOs protesting 
the mining industry
3. Comité Ambiental y 
Campesino Cajamarca
Bogotá/Ibagué/Cajamarca Local branch of national NGO 
(Network for Environmental 
Justice in Colombia). Eco-
socialist focus on climate change 
and mining
4. Fundación Vida Libre Cajamarca Environmental NGO
5. Asociación de 
Productores 
Agroecológicos del Cañón 
del Rio Anaime 
(APACRA)
Cajamarca Small SMO promoting agro-
ecological farming through 





Ibagué Environmental student 
organisation (Universidad de 
Tolima)
7. Conciencia Campesina Ibagué Local branch of a wider global 
Campesino movement. 
Established in Ibagué in 2009
8. Latin American Institute 
for an Alternative Society 
and Alternative Law 
(ILSA)
Bogotá American organisation providing 
legal support to communities and 
SMOs in the region
SMO: social movement organisation; WWF: World Widfe Fund For Nature; NGO: non-governmental 
organisation; ILSA: Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativos.
H1. Socioeconomic constrains affect the use and political effectiveness of digital 
and social media by SMOs in a developing country like Colombia.
Fear of oppression
Colombia has a rich history of oppression by the military, paramilitary and 
guerrilla (e.g. Palacios, 2006). Ziccardi (2013: 126) assumes that digital resistance 
is more likely to occur in states with little respect for human rights. However, the 
very same technologies that have been hailed as tools to free the world are also 
being used to control and oppress opposition to governments worldwide (Joseph, 
2012; Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010). Although Colombia is not particularly 
known for legal or technical restrictions to Internet use, self-censure may occur if 
Internet users feel the normalising effects and disciplining power of Internet 
control and surveillance (Mehta and Darier, 1998). The ‘invisible hand’ of mining 
companies may be felt considering that 89% of human right violations and 78% of 
attacks against union members occur in regions with extractive industries 
(Contraloría General de la República, 2013). The lines between gold mining 
companies, politics and paramilitary forces can be thin (Rochlin, 2015).
This results in our second hypothesis:
H2. Fear of oppression by government and companies limits the engagement of 
SMO members in digital and social media.
Keyboard activism
Social media may lull people into thinking that they are creating change without 
making any real stands. This bears the risk of ‘slacker activism’ or briefly ‘slacktivism’ 
or ‘clicktivism’ – a ‘token display of support for a social cause’ without willingness to 
‘devote significant effort’ to effect change (Kristofferson et al., 2014: 1149). It involves 
low-cost, low-effort actions such as signing online petitions, sharing content and 
pushing social buttons such as ‘liking’ something on Facebook (Halupka, 2014). 
Controversy exists on whether slacktivism is a legitimate form of protest or whether it 
negatively affects more meaningful activism on the ground (Kristofferson et al., 2014). 
The risk of ‘keyboard activism’ is that it may not impress those targeted in protests 
(Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010).
We therefore hypothesise the following: 
H3. Social and digital media use by SMOs does not necessarily translate into greater 
power.
The internal politics of knowledge
Knowledge is value-laden and constructed from interests (Hordijk and Baud, 2006: 
672); ideas can never be seen as innocent but ‘either reinforce or challenge existing 
social and economic arrangements’ (Bryant, 1998: 87). These Foucauldian notions of 
‘knowledge as power’ challenge the much-lauded ability of digital and social media to 
break down hierarchical structures, create horizontal power and increase political 
participation through an almost socialist management of knowledge (Castells, 2012; 
Juris, 2005). There is even ‘the risk of furthering inequality if the population of social 
media users is skewed towards the technologically savvy and those with high human, 
social, and economic capital’ (Valenzuela, 2013: 17). Political ecology has examined 
the ‘politics of knowledge’ (Bryant, 1998; Leach and Scoones, 2007; Peet and Watts, 
2004) as strategies to construct and politically use multiple knowledges to frame 
problems and solutions in one’s interests – by those in power to justify exclusion of 
particular groups from access to resources or by those engaged in social action to 
contest established knowledge and power relations.
Much less attention has been paid to the internal politics of knowledge within 
SMOs, which is much more related to the adage ‘knowledge is power’ and provides 
authority to knowledge holders to negotiate with other parties, advocate their cause and 
pursue their interests. Seeking to maintain this privileged position makes them 
unwilling to share their knowledge (Jacobs et al., 2015), which may be reinforced by a 
lack of trust and solidarity (Kavada, 2005). This may confirm and strengthen the digital 
divide between those who have the means and skills to use Internet and those who have 
not (Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010), with the risk of creating a ‘democratic divide’ 
(Norris, 2001).
Our fourth hypothesis is therefore as follows:
H4. Internal ‘politics of knowledge’ prevent digital and social media to produce 
horizontal leadership structures within SMOs.
Methodology
Mixed methods were employed, including surveys, interviews and participant 
observation. Purposive sampling was used to identify respondents from SMOs, 
snowballing from Universidad del Valle, Cali, where links with SMOs were already 
formed. This technique was required due to prevailing suspicion and mistrust within 
SMOs, which made it impossible to gain access without an introduction.
The survey among SMO members (n = 98) was primarily meant to ascertain the 
levels of mobile phone, smartphone and Internet connectivity. At this stage, questions 
about protest and collective action were asked in broad and open terms, with no 
specific link to the mining industry. An online version enabled people to take the 
survey remotely (n = 23) and mitigate some of the security limitations. Some persons 
(n = 10) undertook the survey digitally in the presence of the principal researcher, 
which gave additional insights into the use of computer technologies.
The survey provided data to test H1–H3. For H1, questions were asked about 
personal characteristics, including education, occupation and digital media possession. 
For H2, questions included whether respondents refrained from publishing information 
on the Internet out of fear of companies or government. Data for H3 were collected 
through questions about the frequency and purpose of Internet, social media and 
smartphone use.
Semi-structured interviews were held with people (n = 24) heading SMOs protesting 
the mining industry. These helped ascertain the nature and actions of SMOs and gave 
insight into how these organisations see the role of digital and social media in their 
protest. More in-depth questions about Internet use and information sharing provided 
data to assess H4.
Participant observation helped making estimates and assumptions about peoples’ 
readiness to use their phones in public spaces and to share collective devices. 
Secondary material such as flyers, maps, books, pamphlets, photographs and notations 
was also collected and reviewed.
Survey data were processed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS); qualitative data from semi-structured interviews were transcribed and coded 
for further analysis.
Results
Among SMOs in Tolima, digital technologies are primarily used to share information 
quickly across difficult to reach locations. This occurs mainly through email lists, and 
while used to some extent to facilitate planning of actions, it still falls second to face-
to-face meetings. Little or no information is shared via social media with a view to 
increasing mobilisation. In order to understand why this is the case, the four hypotheses 
are explored below.




Other Coello Basin 11 8
Total 51 47
Source: Survey 2013.
The use of digital media
None of the SMOs owned collective digital devices, and personal devices were used to 
access the Internet; hence, ownership of a personal device becomes salient. Almost half 
of respondents within the sample of SMO activists have a smartphone (Table 3), 
slightly below the national average, but enough for them to facilitate digital and civic 
engagement.
A total of 42 SMO affiliates (43%) connected to the Internet at least once per day 
using a laptop or PC and about the same amount (40) used a smartphone for daily or 
more frequent Internet access. Only 15 would use an Internet café daily to access the 
Internet; those using Internet cafés generally accessed the Internet less frequently. In 
all, 24 affiliates used an Internet café less than once per fortnight or had never used one 
at all, and 51 regularly used a friend’s device to connect to the Internet. There were no 
surveyed SMO affiliates who had never accessed the Internet.
The majority (70) of survey respondents accessed social media at least once per 
week, with the majority of daily social media activity taking place in Cajamarca. Age 
apparently does not affect social media use; the 50+ age group accounted for 16% of 
users and the 26–30 age group for 24%. However, those aged between 26 and 30 years 
are using social media most often (>3/day). Gender makes no significant difference in 
social media use within the sample group.
The results suggest that there is potential for SMOs to build campaigns through 
social media, as there is sufficient usage among members who also reported regular 
contact with protest-related information online. The use of such information sources 
appears to transcend gender and age and is generally popular, although has yet to reach 
its full potential. While there is not 100% penetration of smartphone use, the levels of 
engagement with mobile Internet technologies is sufficiently high as to enable quick 
and far-reaching dissemination of information. Social media are used extensively, in a 
personal capacity, and the potential to utilise this resource to spread protest-related 
information is apparent, particularly through Facebook. Mobile technologies seem to 
have already begun to cheapen the costs of potential mobilisation and connectivity.
The centralised use of digital media by SMOs themselves in the Tolima region is, 
however, limited, both in scope and reach. Three SMOs have no collective engagement 
with social media at all (Table 4). Semillas de Agua did establish a Facebook page in 
May 2013, but with only 4 posts and 12 followers it can be discounted as a tool in the 
fight against La Colosa.5 The use of social media by World Wide Fund For Nature 
(WWF) Colombia is also curtailed. Despite strong online presence with blogs, 
Facebook pages and a Twitter feed, the information posted is limited by the rules 
outlined by WWF International, implying that they cannot openly support the SMOs in 
Cajamarca (see Note 4). 
Table 4. Social and digital media strategies and use among SMOs. 
SMO Social and digital media 
strategy
Media used Scope of use
1. Semillas de 
Agua
No active use of social media; 




Email: for internal 
communicationsa; Facebook 
page: 64 likes/4 posts total
2. WWF 
Colombia
Active use of social media but 






Email list frequency: 
4/month; Facebook page: 
14,160 Likes/32 
posts/month; Twitter: 14.1K 
followers, 218 x





No active use of social media; 
email lists for interaction with 
other SMOs
Email list Internal communications
4. Fundación 
Vida Libre
No active use of social media; 
email lists for interaction with 
other SMOs
Email list Internal communications
5. APACRA No active use of social media; 
email lists for interaction with 
other SMOs
Email list Internal communications
6. Colectivo 
Cosajuca







Email: for campaigns; 
Facebook page: x Likes (not 
in public domain)/ 11 x





Very active use of social 






Email: for internal 
communications; Facebook 
page: 36,478 Likes/ 15 x
posts/month; Twitter: 886 
followers, 175 x
tweets/month; blog inactive 
since 2012
8. ILSA No active use of social media; 
email lists for interaction with 
other SMOs
Email list Internal communications
SMO: social movement organisation; WWF: World Wide Fund For Nature; APACRA: Asociación de 
Productores Agroecológicos del Cañón del Rio Anaime; ILSA: Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad 
y un Derecho Alternativos.
aInternal in the sense of targeting those subscribed to the email list.
Two organisations that engage collectively with social media do so extensively. 
Colectiva Cosajuca’s fan base is limited to students within Colombia, but it has a vast 
social network and uses social media to spread information about rights and protests, 
and to mobilise students to undertake solidarity protests and strikes. A Colectiva 
Cosajuca affiliate argues that this is the way in which to contact the student body: ‘We 
can reach lots of people really quickly, and without much money too’.6 Conciencia 
Campesina, which brings together peasant movements across the country and globe, 
and which works on a small scale within Cajamarca, is the other notable exception. 
With a Facebook following of 21,991 people,7 it has an extensive presence online and 
is very effective in using social media to highlight its causes. Conciencia Campesina’s 
affiliates work directly in posting to social media and felt that it effectively reaches out 
to a wider audience, informing them of their work and struggle.8 The Conciencia 
Campesina Facebook page attracts a large international following. However, it mainly 
deals with agrarian issues. La Colosa features regularly on their news feed, but is not a 
direct focus.
Interviewees mentioned several obstacles to engaging collectively in the digital 
environment. The first relates to the work needed to keep the information accurate and 
up-to-date. ‘Who would be in charge of deciding what is published?’,9 asked an 
Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativos (ILSA) 
affiliate. A Semillas de Agua affiliate expressed similar concerns: ‘we have to publish 
the right information, and from the right sources, or else people will stop listening to 
us; we would lose our credibility’ (see Note 3). This is of particular significance given 
the reliance on the use of individually owned devices.
Second, SMOs rely on personal devices rather than those owned by the SMO, but 
not all individuals can afford a smartphone or other device to engage effectively with 
digital media. Moreover, the time required to first learn how to effectively use social 
media and then to employ someone to manage it is not deemed cost-effective.10 ILSA 
still publishes everything on paper because
We know how to do that cost effectively, it is the way we have learnt to do it. Our 
publications are available online, but we don’t have the time or money to pay someone to 
build a social media strategy. (See Note 9)
Similarly, Semillas de Agua, Asociación de Productores Agroecológicos del Cañón del 
Rio Anaime (APACRA) and Comité Ambiental Cajamarca stated that ‘We need 
training to use social media effectively, but don’t have the money or time to engage 
with it at present’ (see Note 10). Conciencia Campesina has been able to effectively 
manage this system financially by providing administrative access to their Facebook 
page to multiple persons. Each of these geographically dispersed administrators can 
add or remove information from the public page, via personal devices, without the 
consent of other administrators. This system allows Conciencia Campesina to mitigate 
the costs of managing their knowledge dissemination.
Third, 54% of respondents appeared to be concerned about companies and 
government having access to data, particularly those sent via Internet cafés. This 
translated into a little over half of respondents reconsidering the publication of 
information due to rumours that AGA monitors all activity.
Fourth, education level plays a role, primarily in who has access to the technology. 
Results show a positive correlation between having a higher level of education and 
owning digital media. This could be due to the likelihood of having a better-paid job 
and more income for those with higher qualifications. For people with a lower 
socioeconomic background, a phone was far from their list of priorities: ‘What would I 
need that for? I see everyone when I pass through town each day. It’s just not practical 
to have on the farm; I don’t need a phone, that’s for people who live in the 
city’.11Educational attainment also affects the likelihood of engaging with social media. 
Those with a higher education are more likely to implement social media such as 
Facebook in their daily life (Spearman’s rank for ‘education versus social media use’ 
correlation coefficient = −.44). A further Spearman’s Correlation test on the survey 
data showed that those with university education were marginally more likely to be 
engaged in online protest activities, and while the correlation level is relatively low 
(‘education versus engagement in online protest engagement’ correlation 
coefficient = .122), those who had failed to complete secondary school were 
significantly under-represented in online protest groups (n = 3).
Despite limited use of social media, all SMOs in the region use digital media to aid 
internal and inter-SMO communications. Email has been a great boon, enabling SMOs 
to overcome topographic constraints and accelerate the rate of information exchange 
internally and with partner organisations. Furthermore, email enables them to maintain 
relations with international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as ILSA and 
WWF. Both NGOs make time for regular meetings in Ibagué or Cajamarca, which 
would be difficult to arrange without email contact. Semillas de Agua, Comité 
Ambiental, ILSA and WWF also used email to facilitate conversations with 
organisations outside Colombia. ‘We are able to share a great deal of resources and 
experience [via email]’, stated a Semillas de Agua affiliate (see Note 3).
Finally, three organisations maintain email distribution lists to send mass email 
communications to supporters around the globe. Having joined each of these mailing 
lists it became apparent that only WWF uses this tool regularly. Comité Ambiental uses 
its list only to report urgent actions and events, such as the assassination of the peasant 
activist César García.12 Email and the speed of electronic communication is clearly a 
great tool for SMOs in the region and used extensively. Social media, however, play 
little or no role in the fight against La Colosa and AGA.
Digital technologies and horizontal leadership
Unequal access to electronic devices among individuals and SMOs has implications for 
the control of information and the power dynamics within organisations. The previous 
section suggested that those with higher income and education levels are most likely to 
possess the required technology to access the Internet and to engage with social and 
digital media using these devices. This may pose some difficult barriers in creating 
decentralised organisations and breaking standard knowledge hierarchies within and 
around SMOs.
Although SMO staff are apparently keen to use social media in their work, the 
continuation of old power systems, in which persons with more human and financial 
capital control flows of information and knowledge, affect uptake. Key players, 
generally from a socioeconomically more affluent background, still fulfil a brokerage 
role within the digital environment. Key staff of Semillas de Agua, Conciencia 
Campesina and ILSA, all male, are presently in the position of controlling the flow of 
information about environmental and socioeconomic impacts of mining, which can be 
used to counter the arguments put forward by the mining company. Each has a 
university degree, and all continue to forge relationships with universities and research 
institutes. When discussing the role of social media, each raised concerns over who 
would control the knowledge and output, and it seemed clear that none of them were 
keen to relinquish the hold over the knowledge they presently have. A Semillas de 
Agua member suggested that ‘you shouldn’t just let anyone post, there should be just 
one or two people from each organisation’ (see Note 3). An affiliate of another SMO, 
considered a key member of the resistance by multiple organisations, does not hold a 
high education level, and is often marginalised by the other members of the 
organisation, with many of his suggestions being ignored due to the ‘emotional rather 
than factual’ manner in which they were presented. He is excluded from a knowledge 
production position, and although he does take a lead in knowledge dissemination, this 
is often met with concern by other members. This person’s ability to work in this 
position is derived solely from his high level of social capital; having previously 
worked as a missionary in the region, he knows many families. While other SMO 
members acknowledge the value of his networks, there is a reluctance to place more 
power over knowledge in his hands. Only a minority of SMO members fulfil a 
brokerage role, and they tend to concentrate most of the action in the network around 
themselves, both as content producers and as targets for the messages sent by others. 
This was clearly seen in the offline spaces of focus groups carried out: all information 
was channelled through key actors, and talk of using social media regularly referred 
back to these actors as being those who should control how it is used.
This jostling for control over information also translated into a lack of collaboration 
between SMOs. Despite many meetings between groups, online and offline strategies 
comprised separate and often competing actions.
Discussion
The use of digital media in mining protests
Digital media use in Tolima does not appear to have reached the critical mass which 
would enable it to play a significant role in the protests against La Colosa. All 
organisations in the region use digital media to their advantage and to some extent, but 
most of this revolves around using personal devices for quick email correspondence 
across the region’s difficult terrain and with organisations in other regions and 
countries facing similar issues. This is hugely important in enabling information 
exchange in a quick and far-reaching way, and in protecting this data from laptop thefts 
and hard drive destruction often faced by members of the protest sector. Social media 
play, however, a very small role in campaigning in the region. Four main reasons 
explain this, each of which is explored below through a discussion of the hypotheses.
The effectiveness of digital and social media use among SMOs
We hypothesised that low socioeconomic standing (H1), fear of oppression (H2), the 
nature of keyboard activism (H3) and internal politics of knowledge (H4) limit the 
effectiveness of digital and social media use by SMOs.
Socioeconomic constraints (H1). The cost of the technologies appears to be holding 
back the use of digital media. Despite Colombia’s determination to provide 100% 
Internet access across the nation, the costs for accessing this infrastructure are still 
prohibitively high. Only Conciencia Campesina succeeded in mitigating the costs of 
managing knowledge dissemination by decentralising information management over 
multiple administrators. This provides an example of a more horizontally structured 
knowledge management system that proved to be cost-effective. This, however, 
generally leads to concerns over consistency of story and accuracy of information.
It also became clear that persons actively engaging in SMOs required a reasonable 
level of both financial and human capital to engage with digital media, and even more 
so to engage with protest actions via digital outlets. These factors appear to restrict the 
use of digital and social media by both SMOs and their affiliates more than initially 
assumed.
Fear of oppression (H2). Also the fear that deficient information management may lead 
to a loss of legitimacy or repercussions affected how SMOs used the Internet. Despite 
many incidences of human rights abuses over the last 50 years, we found no evidence 
that this spurred digital actions by SMOs as suggested by Ziccardi (2013). To the 
contrary, limiting digital engagement and withholding information from the Internet 
out of fear that deficient information management may lead to loss of legitimacy or 
repercussions confirm our hypothesis that fear of oppression by government and 
companies limits SMO members’ engagement in digital and social media. Respondents 
were aware that there is little room for anonymity on the Internet. The information held 
about those posting information on sites like Facebook means that by engaging in 
online political activities SMO staff may open themselves up to persecution, not only 
from governments and security forces but also from companies and individuals. These 
concerns made the majority of respondents to be sparing with what they share online, 
suggesting that a lot of information and knowledge is unlikely to be spread via social 
media for fear of reprisals. This suggests that more recent reassessments of the role of 
digital media in the Arab Spring (e.g. Robertson, 2015) are perhaps more accurate than 
Ziccardi’s (2013) expectation that ‘a smart use of technology can help the expansion 
and manifestation of human rights’ (p. 126).13
Keyboard activism (H3). Despite all respondents in the research already being 
members of SMOs, the findings support our third hypothesis about limited 
effectiveness of keyboard activism. Slacktivism often refers to the disconnect between 
motivation and mobilisation (Kristofferson et al., 2014), and while respondents were 
already mobilised, there is a sense that social media will not be able to further increase 
participation among the general populace. If used, it must be to amplify traditional 
forms of protests rather than to merely move them online (Valenzuela, 2013). The 
quick dissemination of knowledge through digital media supports positive notions of 
slacktivism, enhances political engagement of SMO members in the region and ensures 
that the momentum of the organisation is kept in flow. Using little more than email 
distribution lists to share information does, however, mean only ‘preaching to the 
converted’. While slacktivism was not recorded in itself, the fear that keyboard 
activism moves protest away from the streets and does not reach those targeted in the 
protests means that social media are barely used to increase levels of political 
engagement. Furthermore, SMOs in Tolima may be subject to their own introvert form 
of clicktivism. Constantly sharing information quickly via email among themselves has 
led to the development of a positive feedback loop, in which there is a sense of doing 
much work and producing a large amount of positive results, which in reality are rarely 
translated into increased participation or direct action. Further research is needed to 
unravel the effects of such digital and social media use on public mobilisation and 
political effectiveness.
The internal politics of knowledge (H4). In Tolima, the ideal of breaking down 
hierarchical structures and creating horizontal power failed to manifest itself. Although 
SMOs in the region consider creating a collective counter narrative to the government 
and mining company discourse as hugely important, strong hierarchical structures are 
perpetuated, reinforcing scientific knowledge and a male-educated dominance within 
SMOs. While a lack of finances and skills are oft-mentioned hindrances to including 
more social media within the work of SMOs, it appears that the underlying concern 
about knowledge ownership and management is a greater barrier to opening up to 
wider participation in knowledge production and sharing. Repeated concerns were 
heard as to who might control and hold the knowledge spread through social media and 
how the information and knowledge can be kept accurate. While this may partly be 
driven by concerns about a demobilising effect or violent repercussions (see H2), the 
fear of losing power and status as the head of an SMO might be reducing the desire to 
engage in more horizontal organisational structures. Knowledge production and 
management among SMOs in Tolima are therefore heavily controlled by those with 
higher socioeconomic backgrounds – a situation compounded by the lack of collective 
devices. This corroborates our final hypothesis that the internal ‘politics of knowledge’ 
impede digital and social media to produce horizontal leadership structures within 
SMOs. Showing traits of a reinforcing mechanism for outmoded power models, it is 
unlikely that increased use of digital and social media in Tolima will break down 
existing hierarchies. To the contrary, these hierarchies first need to be broken before 
greater levels of participation through digital and social media can be achieved.
Conclusion
We examined whether and how Colombian SMOs use digital media in protesting 
adverse social and environmental effects of the mining industry. While limited use of 
social media by SMOs in Tolima makes it difficult to assess their level of impact on the 
fight against La Colosa, clear connections between the available digital infrastructure 
and the use of digital media to create, disseminate and view knowledge and the 
mobilisation within SMOs were observed. In Tolima, digital media, almost exclusively 
email, have enhanced the connectivity between SMOs. In a country with long and 
difficult journeys due to vast distances between towns and the mountainous terrain, the 
power of digital media to disseminate information, goals and events should not be 
underestimated. While this use of email has had important implications for sharing 
knowledge about the impacts of mining companies and protests, it has not led to a 
breakdown of hierarchies and, in the majority of opinions, needs to be coupled with 
more direct action.
The fight against AGA in Tolima will not be easily won. Fear of oppression and the 
constraints of keyboard activism still limit the effectiveness of digital action in the fight 
against the mining industry. It is, however, unlikely that SMOs will reach a critical 
mass, or draw enough international attention to their struggle to militate against the 
juggernaut of AGA, without the aid of social media and wider public participation. 
Using all digital means available to them, including the Internet and social media, may 
help SMOs in reaching critical mass through the creation of epistemic communities 
that anybody with an Internet connection can access while retaining the SMOs as the 
main nodes within protest networks engaging in outreach activities.
Attention to internal communication is also needed. Evidence regarding the final 
research question suggests that the internal politics of knowledge limit horizontal 
leadership. More research is needed for a better understanding of the mechanisms that 
control the diffusion of protest information. Particular attention is needed for the power 
structures within which digital sources are used and owned. The much championed 
ability of social media to create horizontal power structures and reach much-needed 
critical mass cannot develop organically where the power over knowledge and its 
dissemination continues to lay in the same, generally male, middle-class, hands.
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Notes
1. This article defines digital media as all fixed and mobile devices that can access the Internet 
(Anduiza et al., 2012). Social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter) are understood as the 
infrastructure and tools used to produce and disseminate digital information.
2. Based on an analysis of gold mining conflicts in the Environmental Justice Atlas (2014) 
available at ejatlas.org (accessed May 2015). 
3. Interview with Semillas de Agua staff, Ibagué, Colombia, 8 September 2013.
4. Interview with World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) Colombia staff, Cali, Colombia, 10 
July 2013.
5. Information from Semillas de Agua’s Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/
semillasde.agua.5
6. Interview with Colectiva Cosajuca staff, Cajamarca, Colombia, 4 August 2013.
7. Information from Conciencia Campesina’s Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/
concienciacampesina?fref=ts (accessed 27 December 2013).
8. Interviews with Conciencia Campesina staff, Cajamarca, Colombia, 3 August 2013.
9. Interview with Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativos 
(ILSA) staff, Bogotá, Colombia, 26 August 2013.
10. Focus group Semillas de Agua, Ibagué, Colombia, 8 August 2013.
11. Interview with a farmer/Semillas de Vida affiliate, Ibagué, Colombia, 6 September 2013.
12. Peasant environmental leader from Cajamarca who protested the Colosa mine and was 
assassinated on 2 November 2013.
13. As noted by an anonymous referee, further research would be needed to substantiate this 
fear based on judicial reports, human rights accusations or formal investigations.
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